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Abstract	
	
We	tend	to	think	of	consecration	as	something	happening	to	individuals:	we	say	that	
someone	has	been	consecrated	when	they	have	been	declared	a	saint,	inducted	into	a	
hall	of	fame,	or	presented	with	a	lifetime	achievement	award.	The	present	article	
explores	the	analytical	payoffs	of	looking	at	consecration	as	a	population-level	
phenomenon	–	that	is,	as	the	delineation	of	clear-cut	divides	between	the	chosen	and	
the	rest	in	a	population	of	candidates.	This	approach,	I	argue,	brings	out	the	unique	
character	of	consecration	as	an	abstract	process	of	status	formation:	it	enhances	the	
perceived	worth	of	the	consecrated,	not	by	confirming	that	they	are	individually	worthy,	
but	by	asserting	the	existence	in	a	field	of	a	reliable	hierarchy	of	worthiness.	A	
population-level	approach	also	implies	that	consecrating	institutions	derive	some	of	
their	authority	from	the	forcefulness	of	the	divides	they	draw	between	elected	
individuals	and	others.	The	article	shows	how	this	explains	some	of	the	salient	features	
of	retrospective	consecration	projects.	To	make	these	points	I	analyze	cases	of	
consecration	in	a	variety	of	empirical	domains,	from	politics	to	the	arts,	sports,	and	
religion.	
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Introduction	
	
In	the	fall	of	1991,	New	Yorker	journalist	Janet	Malcolm	started	a	series	of	interviews	
with	artist	David	Salle.	Salle	was	then	in	his	late	thirties.	In	the	1980s	he	had	been	
among	the	superstars	of	the	New	York	art	scene	–	one	of	the	most	widely	publicized,	
exhibited,	and	collected	artists	of	his	generation.	Yet	by	the	early	nineties	Salle’s	star	
was	already	fading.	In	fact,	Malcolm’s	interviews	do	not	so	much	focus	on	the	artist’s	
work	as	on	his	dumbfoundedness	in	front	of	an	art	market	he	had	been	at	the	center	of,	
and	from	which	he	felt	slowly	sidelined.	Contentwise,	and	although	nothing	in	it	had	
really	changed,	Salle’s	work	was	increasingly	assailed	for	being	insignificant.	Dealers	
would	stay	away	from	him.	And	in	a	rather	desperate	effort	to	bring	back	the	glow	of	his	
name,	he	turned	to	the	press	for	interviews	in	which	he	hoped	to	explain	who	he	was,	
what	he	did,	and	why	it	was	important.	In	short,	Salle	had	lost	it;	he	realized	it;	and	he	
knew	that	what	had	looked	like	a	certainty	–	that	his	work	would	secure	a	place	in	art	
history	–	was	now	in	jeopardy.	Rather	poignantly,	Malcolm	concludes:	"[Salle]	is	an	
artist	who	believes	in	the	autonomy	of	art,	who	sees	the	universe	of	art	as	an	alternative	
to	the	universe	of	life	(…).	Yet	he	is	also	someone	who	is	drawn	to	the	world	of	popular	
criticism,	to	the	bazaar	where	paintings	and	books	and	performances	are	crudely	and	
carelessly	rated,	like	horses	or	slaves,	and	who	wants	to	be	one	of	the	Chosen,	even	as	
he	disdains	the	choosers;	in	other	words,	he	is	like	everybody	else"	(Malcolm,	2013:	21).	
	
The	story	of	David	Salle	–	like	most	dramatic	stories	of	rise	and	fall	–	has	obvious	
sociological	appeal,	as	it	poses	in	a	magnified	way	a	series	of	questions	that	indeed	
speak	to	any	of	us:	why	are	we	regarded	as	more	or	less	valuable	–	even	though	our	
intrinsic	merit	is	unchanged?	What	are	the	forces	beyond	our	actual	talent	and	hard	
work	–	and	therefore	beyond	our	control	–	that	distort	the	recognition	we	receive	from	
society?	How	do	various	actors	and	institutions,	which	often	mediate	the	reception	of	
our	work,	influence	its	perceived	worth	and	ultimate	success?	
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In	more	scholarly	language,	Salle’s	story	poses	the	question	of	the	formation	of	status,	
i.e.	of	observers’	perception	of	the	worthiness	of	others.	And	it	invites	us	to	reflect	on	
how	status	is	cemented	retrospectively	–	what	we	sometimes	capture	with	the	
commonplace	phrase:	“How	will	people	go	down	in	history?”	
	
Yet	Salle’s	case	is	also	interesting	in	another,	more	specific	respect.	Salle	–	and	Malcolm	
after	him	–	intuitively	understands	that	a	key	process	whereby	status	is	created	in	the	
world	he	inhabits	involves	being	placed	on	the	side	of	the	chosen,	and	distinguished	
from	those	that	are	not	chosen.	In	fact,	Salle	cares	about	his	elevation	to	the	ranks	of	
the	chosen	even	while	he	questions	the	ability	of	the	choosers	–	art	critics	or	museum	
curators	–	to	understand	his	work,	and	therefore	their	legitimacy	to	evaluate	it.	There	is	
something	intriguing	to	this	seeming	contradiction.	In	this	article	I	show	that	there	is	
something	heuristic	to	it,	too.	Salle’s	ambivalence	toward	his	election	compels	us	to	
unpack	the	various	processes	whereby	status	is	granted	to	individuals	when	they	get	
commended	by	authoritative	third	parties.	And	it	points	in	particular	to	the	distinct	
features	of	the	process	Salle	is	after	here,	namely	retrospective	consecration.2	
	
Consecration	–	the	operation	whereby	certain	objects	or	persons	are	identified	as	
deserving	admiration	over	other	ones,	typically	through	their	selection	to	a	prestigious	
prize	or	their	induction	into	a	museum	or	a	hall	of	fame	–	is	a	unique	social	
phenomenon	with	dramatic	consequences.	It	propels	individuals	in	the	public	eye,	
making	them	worthy	of	a	veneration	and	esteem	that	sometimes	seems	to	go	beyond	
what	we	attach	to	mere	humans.	In	many	realms	of	social	life	it	is	the	utmost	reward	for	
participants,	one	that	places	them	permanently	and	unquestionably	among	the	great	in	
their	field.	Consecration	therefore	appears	as	the	ultimate	process	of	status	formation,	
and	sociology	would	be	lacking	if	it	did	not	incorporate	a	precise	understanding	of	its	
																																																								
2	In	this	article	I	use	the	terms	consecration	and	retrospective	consecration	interchangeably.	This	is	mostly	
for	brevity,	but	it	also	makes	sense	theoretically:	as	my	argument	will	suggest,	the	uniqueness	of	
consecration	as	a	process	of	status	formation	does	not	arise	from	its	(sometimes)	retrospective	character.	
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nature.	Many	case	studies	in	social	science	have	explored	the	determinants	of	
consecration.	A	general	model	of	it,	however,	remains	to	be	spelled	out.	
	
This	article	develops	a	theoretical	definition	of	consecration	and	shows	how	this	
definition	illuminates	some	of	the	salient	features	of	retrospective	consecration	
projects.	The	pull	of	the	demonstration	comes	from	reflecting	on	how	consecration	
generates	prestige	for	those	who	get	consecrated.	The	analysis	therefore	departs	from	
prior	approaches	that	have	probed	the	causes	of	consecration	–	that	is,	the	individual	
characteristics	and	contextual	factors	that	make	certain	candidates	more	likely	to	be	
picked	by	consecrating	institutions	(e.g.	Allen	and	Lincoln,	2004;	Allen	and	Parsons,	
2006;	Schmutz,	2005;	Schmutz	and	Faupel,	2010;	Cattani	et	al.,	2014).	In	contrast,	the	
present	account	highlights	the	specific	mechanism	whereby	status	is	bestowed	on	
individuals	when	they	go	through	operations	of	consecration.	
	
We	tend	to	think	of	consecration	as	something	happening	to	the	individuals	or	things	
that	get	consecrated.	We	thus	say	that	someone	has	been	consecrated	when	they	have	
been	inducted	into	a	hall	of	fame	or	presented	with	a	lifetime	achievement	award.	The	
main	claim	of	this	article	is	that	we	would	benefit	from	looking	at	consecration	as	a	
population-level	phenomenon.	In	fact,	I	show	that	its	distinct	character	as	a	mechanism	
of	status	formation	only	appears	if	we	consider	that	consecration	is	not	so	much	about	
identifying	deserving	individuals	as	it	is	about	dividing	a	population	of	candidates	into	
two	clearly	demarcated	groups:	the	chosen	and	the	rest.	
	
This	population-level	approach	comes	with	two	chief	payoffs,	which	form	the	article’s	
main	contributions.	First,	it	points	to	a	precise	and	abstract	definition	of	consecration	
that	accounts	for	its	conceptual	specificity	while	making	it	observable	in	a	variety	of	
social	settings.	Consecration,	I	argue,	is	a	process	of	status	formation	that	acts	on	the	
perceived	value	of	things	or	individuals	by	creating	crisp	boundaries	between	the	
chosen	and	others	within	a	group	of	candidates.	In	doing	so,	it	makes	the	statement	
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that	it	is	possible	to	distinguish	in	that	group	between	individuals	who	are	worthy	of	
esteem	and	others	who	are	not.	It	is	by	asserting	the	meaningfulness	of	that	distinction,	
not	by	certifying	the	quality	of	the	chosen,	that	consecration	enhances	the	status	of	
those	standing	on	the	right	side	of	the	consecration	divide.	
	
Second,	a	population-level	approach	gives	insight	into	the	origins	of	the	authority	of	
consecrating	institutions.	It	locates	these	origins	in	the	nature	of	the	operations	
performed	by	these	institutions	when	they	partition	populations	into	chosen	and	non-
chosen,	and	not	only	in	the	rational	criteria	they	use	to	identify	individuals	deemed	
worthy	of	admiration.	In	the	analysis	to	follow,	I	show	how	this	explains	some	of	the	
salient	features	of	retrospective	consecration	projects	–	and,	incidentally,	David	Salle’s	
ambivalence	toward	them.	
	
To	make	these	points,	I	first	delineate	the	weaknesses	underlying	current	
understandings	of	consecration	as	a	process	of	status	formation.	I	then	turn	to	empirical	
examples	that	illustrate	the	ubiquity	of	consecration	and	point	to	a	characterization	of	it	
as	a	population-level	phenomenon.	Through	an	analysis	of	these	examples	I	arrive	at	a	
precise,	abstract,	and	transposable	definition	of	consecration.	I	finally	show	how	that	
definition	sheds	light	on	the	distinctive	traits	of	retrospective	consecration	projects.	In	
particular,	my	definition	suggests	that	consecrating	institutions	derive	part	of	their	
authority	from	the	forcefulness	of	the	divides	they	draw	between	elected	individuals	
and	others.	This	places	logical	constraints	on	what	these	institutions	can	do	without	
jeopardizing	their	authority	–	explaining	the	existence	in	many	fields	of	a	single	pinnacle	
of	greatness,	the	difficulty	to	deconsecrate,	or	the	reluctance	of	consecrating	
organizations	to	induct	certain	greats	while	leaving	others	out.	
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Consecration	as	a	process	of	status	formation	
	
By	trade	sociologists	puzzle	over	non-meritocratic	inequality	–	that	is,	inequality	in	
achievement	that	cannot	be	traced	to	intrinsic	differences	in	merit,	ability,	or	talent.	In	
modern,	meritocratic	societies,	we	wonder	why	individuals	whose	deservingness	does	
not	differ	widely	nevertheless	enjoy	considerably	different	levels	of	success.	The	classic	
approach	to	that	problem	traces	disparities	in	outcomes	to	unequal	access	to	resources	
–	typically	by	race,	gender,	or	class	origin.	A	different	(though	not	incompatible)	avenue	
consists	in	studying	the	processes	that	alter	our	perception	of	the	worth	of	individuals	
even	while	leaving	their	intrinsic	merit	unchanged.	These	processes	we	can	refer	to	as	
processes	of	status	formation.	An	example	is	credentialing,	which	happens	when	an	
institution	provides	people	with	a	stamp	of	quality	and	thereby	shapes	the	way	others	
perceive	that	quality	without	altering	it	(Collins,	1979).	Two	equally	deserving	
individuals	will	thus	be	viewed	differently,	and	they	may	enjoy	very	different	outcomes,	
if	one	of	them	has	been	credentialed	and	the	other	has	not.	
	
Studying	processes	of	status	formation	is	interesting	in	at	least	two	respects.	First,	it	
places	status	(the	way	people	are	regarded	by	others)	back	at	center	stage	as	an	
essential	component	of	inter-individual	inequality.	Second,	and	perhaps	more	
fundamentally,	understanding	the	formation	of	status	also	means	understanding	the	
formation	of	legitimacy	(Johnson	et	al.,	2006).	Status-endowed	individuals	are	
individuals	whose	outcomes	–	whether	deserved	or	not	–	are	less	likely	to	be	
challenged.	When	studying	processes	of	status	formation,	then,	we	are	studying	the	
foundations	of	legitimate	inequality.	
	
In	most	realms	of	human	endeavor	individuals	acquire	social	status	as	they	go	through	
evaluation	and	reward	systems	that	earn	them	public	recognition	(Crane,	1972,	1976;	
Goode,	1978;	Zuckerman,	1992;	English,	2005;	Ihl,	2006,	2007;	Best,	2011).	Sociologists	
have	long	argued	that	these	reward	systems	generate	status	hierarchies	which	are	only	
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loosely	reflective	of	underlying	differences	in	merit	or	ability	between	individuals.	In	
science	for	example,	Robert	Merton	famously	showed	how	the	way	these	systems	are	
set	up	“affects	the	allocation	of	rewards	to	scientists	for	their	contributions”	(Merton,	
1968:	56).	Likewise,	Lamont	and	colleagues	suggest	that	in	a	range	of	social	domains,	
culturally	patterned	procedures	of	evaluation	account	for	the	differential	assignment	
of	status	to	various	people	or	groups,	even	though	their	actual	qualities	do	not	differ	
sharply	(Guetzkow	et	al.	2004;	Lamont,	2010;	Lamont	et	al.,	2014;	Beljean	et	al.,	2015).	
	
Because	processes	of	status	formation	are	generally	conceived	of	as	abstract	
mechanisms,	they	are	meant	to	be	observed	in	a	variety	of	contexts,	in	turn	helping	us	
to	identify	regularities	in	the	way	status-based	inequality	emerges	across	diverse	
evaluation	systems.	A	basic	condition	for	this	to	happen,	however,	is	that	these	
processes	be	delineated	precisely	–	in	other	words	that	we	arrive	at	a	distinct	
characterization	of	each	and	at	a	clear	sense	of	how	they	compare	with	one	another.	
	
This	clarity	and	this	generalizability	are	only	partially	achieved	in	current	work	on	
consecration.	This	is	because	studies	of	consecration	have	been	more	concerned	with	
identifying	its	causes	than	with	defining	it	as	a	distinct	process	of	status	formation.	
These	studies	typically	point	to	a	mix	of	personal	attributes	and	contextual	factors	as	
forces	shaping	the	chances	that	various	individuals	will	be	distinguished	by	a	field’s	
consecrating	institutions	(Childress	et	al.,	2017).	Thus,	we	know	that	music	by	female	
performers	is	less	likely	to	make	it	into	the	list	of	the	five	hundred	greatest	albums	of	all	
time	put	out	by	Rolling	Stone	magazine,	and	that	this	owes	in	part	to	the	cultural	
frameworks	experts	use	to	justify	inclusion	among	the	all-time	great	(Schmutz	and	
Faupel,	2010).	Similarly,	we	know	that	early	recognition	is	a	strong	predictor	of	
retrospective	consecration:	players	with	more	Cy	Young	Awards	or	All-Star	Game	
selections	–	two	distinctions	earned	while	one’s	career	is	still	ongoing	–	have	greater	
chances	of	being	ultimately	inducted	in	the	U.S.	Baseball	Hall	of	Fame	(Allen	and	
Parsons,	2006);	and	movies	that	achieved	greater	critical,	professional,	and	popular	
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recognition	upon	their	release	are	in	a	better	position	to	enter	the	National	Film	
Registry	or	the	American	Film	Institute’s	list	of	greatest	films	of	all	time	(Allen	and	
Lincoln,	2004).3	Broader	contextual	circumstances	play	a	role,	too:	research	in	
organizational	science	has	found	that	the	prestige	of	record	labels	affects	the	likelihood	
that	jazz	songs	will	be	adopted	into	the	canon	of	jazz	standards	(Phillips,	2013);	that	
actors	who	work	with	elite	collaborators	have	better	odds	of	being	nominated	for	
Hollywood’s	Academy	Awards	(Rossman	et	al.,	2010);	and	that	the	greater	
embeddedness	of	cultural	producers	within	their	field	facilitates	their	consecration	by	
peers,	but	not	by	outside	critics	(Cattani	et	al.,	2014).	
	
This	body	of	work	provides	important	insights	into	the	determinants	–	sometimes	
domain-specific,	sometimes	not	–	that	lead	certain	individuals	to	be	remembered	as	
great	in	their	respective	fields.	A	description	of	consecration’s	causes,	however,	is	not	
an	understanding	of	it.	In	fact,	and	much	as	there	is	of	interest	in	the	studies	above,	a	
theoretical	account	of	consecration	as	a	process	of	status	formation	–	that	is,	an	account	
of	what	it	does	to	shape	the	esteem	we	grant	to	the	consecrated	–	remains	elusive.	
	
Attempts	at	defining	consecration	theoretically	generally	draw	on	Pierre	Bourdieu’s	
work	on	consecration	in	cultural	and	political	fields	(Bourdieu,	1991,	1993).	Bourdieu’s	
elaboration	of	the	notion,	however,	is	remarkably	equivocal.	On	one	hand,	he	views	
consecration	as	the	bestowing	of	symbolic	capital	(a	different	word	for	status)	by	agents	
endowed	with	the	authority	to	impose	judgments	in	a	given	field.	In	fields	of	cultural	
production,	that	operation,	which	essentially	amounts	to	an	act	of	credentialing,	is	
central	to	the	production	of	value.	Hence,	“for	the	author,	the	critic,	the	art	dealer,	the	
publisher	or	the	theater	manager,	the	only	legitimate	accumulation	consists	in	making	a	
name	for	oneself,	a	known,	recognized	name,	a	capital	of	consecration	implying	a	power	
																																																								
3	For	similar	findings	in	popular	music,	see	Schmutz	(2005).	Lang	and	Lang	also	describe	the	processes	
whereby	contemporary	recognition	is	transformed	into	long-term	renown	in	the	world	of	etching	(Lang	
and	Lang,	1988).	
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to	consecrate	objects	(with	a	trademark	or	signature)	or	persons	(through	publication,	
exhibition,	etc.)	and	therefore	to	give	value,	and	to	appropriate	the	profits	from	this	
operation”	(Bourdieu,	1993:	75).4	
	
This	view	departs	from	Bourdieu’s	description	of	consecration	in	his	work	on	power	and	
initiation	rituals	(Bourdieu,	1991).	Here	consecration	is	an	operation	of	“social	magic”	
that	acts	by	creating	“discontinuity	out	of	continuity,”	i.e.	by	separating	individuals	
deemed	worthy	of	admiration	from	others	who	are	not.	The	efficacy	of	consecration	
rituals	–	such	as	rites	of	passage	–	arises	from	the	fact	that	they	introduce	“an	arbitrary	
boundary”	between	the	chosen	and	the	rest	(Bourdieu,	1991:	118).	At	odds	with	the	
earlier	approach,	and	although	it	is	unclear	how	exactly	Bourdieu’s	social	magic	
produces	its	effects,	it	is	now	through	their	separation	from	others,	not	through	the	
accolade	they	receive	from	an	authoritative	third	party,	that	the	chosen	gain	status	
through	the	consecration	process.5	
	
																																																								
4	Bourdieu	explicitly	compares	this	process	with	religious	consecration	when	he	claims	that	“cultural	
consecration	does	indeed	confer	on	the	objects,	persons,	and	situations	it	touches	a	sort	of	ontological	
promotion	akin	to	a	transubstantiation”	(Bourdieu,	1984:	6).			
5	Bourdieu’s	thinking	is	actually	even	shiftier,	as	he	goes	on	to	note	that	a	ritual’s	main	effect	is	to	
“separate	those	who	have	undergone	it,	not	from	those	who	have	not	yet	undergone	it,	but	from	those	
who	will	not	undergo	it	in	any	sense,	and	thereby	to	institute	a	lasting	difference	between	those	to	whom	
the	rite	pertains	and	those	to	whom	it	does	not	pertain.”	He	illustrates	in	reference	to	Kabyle	circumcision	
rituals:	“What,	in	effect,	does	this	line	separate?	Obviously	it	separates	a	before	and	an	after:	the	
uncircumcised	child	and	the	circumcised	child;	or	even	the	whole	set	of	uncircumcised	children	and	the	
set	of	circumcised	adults.	In	fact,	the	most	important	division	(…)	is	the	division	it	creates	between	all	
those	who	are	subject	to	circumcision,	boys	and	men,	children	or	adult,	and	those	who	are	not	subject	to	
it,	i.e.	girls	and	women.	(…)	Thus	sexually	differentiated	rites	consecrate	the	difference	between	the	
sexes:	they	constitute	a	simple	difference	of	fact	as	a	legitimate	distinction”	(Bourdieu,	1991:	117-118).	
Here	I	shall	not	comment	on	the	notion	that	consecration	rituals	institute	a	difference	between	
individuals	who	are	eligible	to	them	and	others	who	are	not.	Note,	however,	that	this	idea	distracts	
Bourdieu	away	from	analyzing	how	the	introduction	of	the	more	basic	difference	–	between	those	who	
passed	and	those	who	did	not	–	enhances	the	status	of	the	consecrated.	
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Bourdieu’s	ambiguity	looms	large	in	extant	research	on	consecration.	Problems	arise	for	
example	in	the	work	of	Allen	and	Parsons	(2006)	and	Allen	and	Lincoln	(2004),	who	
study	the	determinants	of	retrospective	cultural	consecration	in	respectively	baseball	
and	film,	and	probably	go	the	farthest	in	advancing	a	clear	definition	of	the	notion.	
Consecration,	they	argue,	is	“the	attempt	by	a	group	or	organization	to	impose	a	
durable	symbolic	distinction	between	those	objects	and	individuals	worthy	of	
veneration	as	exemplars	of	excellence	within	a	field	of	cultural	production	and	those	
that	are	not”	–	a	definition	clearly	indebted	to	Bourdieu’s	analysis	of	power	rituals,	
though	applied	to	fields	of	cultural	production.	The	way	Allen	and	colleagues	see	
it,	however,	the	main	issue	with	consecration	is	that	it	turns	a	continuum	of	small	
quality	differences	into	a	rather	crude	distinction	between	the	worthy	and	the	rest,	so	
that	“one	of	the	most	important	tasks	of	any	[retrospective	consecration]	project	is	to	
legitimate	the	(…)	somewhat	arbitrary	distinction	between	those	who	have	been	
consecrated	and	those	who	have	not”	(Allen	and	Parsons,	2006:	808-809).	Hence,	the	
defining	feature	of	consecration	–	the	sharp	divide	it	introduces	between	the	worthy	
and	others	–	is	now	a	hindrance	to	its	efficacy.	Ultimately,	Allen	and	colleagues	go	on	to	
argue,	the	legitimacy	of	this	divide	rests	on	the	authority	of	consecrating	institutions.	
Thus,	when	it	comes	to	explaining	the	power	of	consecration	they	seem	to	revert	to	
Bourdieu’s	first	definition	–	of	consecration	as	an	act	of	selection	and	credentialing	by	
an	authoritative	third	party.	
	
This	analytical	glissando	has	important	consequences.	Most	strikingly,	it	obliterates	the	
role	of	separation	as	a	force	enhancing	the	status	of	the	consecrated.	This	does	away	
with	the	major	insight	in	Bourdieu’s	work	on	ritual	consecration	(and	the	one	that	came	
closest	to	defining	it	as	theoretically	distinct	from	credentialing):	that	consecration	is	
about	the	production,	not	so	much	of	discontinuity	out	of	continuity,	but	of	difference	
out	of	sameness.	In	dropping	that	insight	one	also	gives	up	all	the	truly	interesting	
questions:	How	exactly	does	the	production	of	difference	have	status-imparting	effects?	
What	role,	if	any,	does	ritual	play	in	the	process?	And	how	does	this	affect	the	
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conditions	for	consecration	to	successfully	elevate	the	status	of	the	consecrated?	The	
remainder	of	this	article	explores	these	questions	in	reference	to	empirical	cases	that	
we	can	non-controversially	regard	as	instances	of	consecration.	It	stresses	the	analytical	
payoffs	of	looking	at	consecration	as	a	population-level	phenomenon	–	that	is,	as	the	
production	of	difference	out	of	sameness	in	a	population	of	candidates.	This	approach,	I	
argue,	brings	out	the	unique	character	of	consecration	as	an	abstract	process	of	status	
formation:	it	enhances	the	perceived	worth	of	the	consecrated,	not	by	confirming	that	
they	are	individually	great,	but	by	asserting	the	existence	in	a	field	of	a	meaningful	
hierarchy	of	greatness.	
	
	
Consecration:	theoretical	formulation	
	
Consecrated	individuals	and	consecrated	populations	
	
One	of	the	most	celebrated	speeches	in	political	history	is	an	act	of	retrospective	
consecration.	The	Gettysburg	Address	was	delivered	by	Abraham	Lincoln	in	November	
of	1863	to	“dedicate,	consecrate	and	hallow”	the	battlefield	of	Gettysburg,	turning	it	
into	a	final	resting	place	for	the	Northern	dead	of	the	Civil	War.	Its	immediate	purpose	
was	to	collectively	extoll	those	who	four	month	earlier	had	fallen	on	these	grounds,	
giving	for	the	cause	of	the	Union	the	“last	full	measure	of	devotion.”	Yet	the	Gettysburg	
Address	was	also	the	initial	step	in	the	establishment	of	a	national	cemetery	system	
infused	with	patriotic	symbolism	(Savage,	1997).	Gettysburg	itself	quickly	transformed	
from	a	site	of	human	and	animal	decomposition	into	a	holy	shrine	“designed	to	
commemorate	not	the	individual,	but	the	nation”	(Grant,	2005:	513).	Around	1884,	
aided	by	the	arrival	of	a	new	railroad	line,	it	became	a	new	pilgrimage	destination,	a	
“mecca	for	patriots”	(Weeks,	2003:	55).	And	as	Bellah	has	noted,	national	cemeteries	
built	on	the	model	of	Gettysburg	ended	up	forming	a	centerpiece	of	America’s	“civil	
religion”	(Bellah,	1970:	178).	
12	
	
	
Here	I	show	how	the	architecture	and	history	of	the	U.S.	national	cemetery	system	hold	
cues	for	understanding	consecration	and	its	unique	way	of	granting	status	to	the	
consecrated.	In	line	with	Bourdieu’s	thinking	on	power	and	legitimacy	rituals,	they	point	
to	consecration	as	a	population-level	phenomenon.	They	also	hint	to	the	distinct	
mechanism	whereby	consecration	elevates	the	prestige	of	those	who	go	through	it:	by	
drawing	unflinching	divides	between	the	chosen	and	others,	it	asserts	the	existence	in	a	
field	of	a	reliable	hierarchy	of	greatness.	
	
The	design	of	the	cemetery	at	Gettysburg,	which	over	time	became	the	norm	for	other	
national	burying	grounds,	powerfully	conveys	how	consecration	acts	through	the	
division	of	a	population	–	or	equivalently,	of	physical	space	–	into	separate	groups	or	
regions.	The	monotonous	arrangement	of	the	graves	and	the	uniformity	of	the	grave	
markers	were	introduced	by	architect	William	Sauders	“with	the	deliberate	intent	of	
drawing	no	distinctions	of	rank	or	status	between	the	dead,”	but	instead	to	achieve	a	
sense	of	“consecration	of	the	land	itself”	(Grant,	2005:	514;	see	also	Laqueur,	1994:	
158).	In	effect	that	scenery	redirects	the	observer’s	attention,	from	the	individual	merits	
of	a	collection	of	fallen	soldiers	to	the	stark	demarcation	between	the	fallen	and	others,	
the	praiseworthy	and	the	rest,	sacred	and	profane	ground.	
	
Hence	Gettysburg,	and	other	national	cemeteries	after	it,	work	by	conspicuously	setting	
the	admirable	and	non-admirable	apart.	Their	status-conferring	power	rests	on	their	
ability	to	display	a	clear-cut	divide	between	the	worthy	and	others	–	and	not	on	the	
careful	vetting	of	the	worthy	themselves.	That	the	crispness	of	this	divide	lies	at	the	
core	of	their	efficacy	is	further	illustrated	by	the	themes	of	pollution	and	purge	that	
resurface	throughout	their	history.	In	1865,	for	example,	the	Maryland	legislature	
passed	a	bill	allowing	the	burial	of	Confederate	dead	in	the	national	cemetery	at	
Antietam.	The	decision	was	soon	challenged,	however,	not	only	because	Southern	
soldiers	were	not	thought	to	deserve	interment	there,	but	because	“a	national	cemetery	
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would	be	desecrated	by	containing	the	bodies	of	those	who	fought	in	the	rebel	ranks:”	
there	would	be	no	mixing	allowed,	no	blurring	of	the	divide	between	the	worthy	and	
others,	lest	the	whole	enterprise	should	fall	apart	(The	New	York	Times,	January	30,	
1868;	on	the	enduring	issue	of	the	Confederate	dead,	see	Grant,	2004).	
	
In	a	classic	1985	article,	epidemiologist	Geoffrey	Rose	encouraged	his	fellow	scientists	to	
move	from	the	study	of	“sick	individuals”	to	the	analysis	of	“sick	populations”	(Rose,	
1985).	In	Rose’s	view,	epidemiology	had	been	focusing	too	much	on	the	“causes	of	
cases”,	that	is,	on	the	factors	that	position	individuals	on	a	distribution	of	greater	or	
lesser	sickness,	and	not	enough	on	the	“causes	of	incidence”,	or	on	the	origins	and	
shape	of	the	distribution	itself.	To	build	on	that	language,	the	U.S.	national	cemetery	
system	suggests	that	consecration	is	less	a	cause	of	cases	than	it	is	a	cause	of	incidence:	
it	is	less	about	the	production	of	consecrated	individuals	than	it	is	about	the	production	
of	consecrated	populations	–	that	is,	about	the	creation	of	distributions	(although	
admittedly	very	simple	ones,	namely	divisions	between	the	chosen	and	others)	within	
fields	of	candidates.	
	
	
Asserting	hierarchy	
	
This	approach	eventually	points	to	the	unique	mechanism	whereby	consecration	
generates	status	for	the	consecrated:	by	installing	a	steady	division	in	a	population	or	a	
space,	it	makes	the	statement	that	the	worthy	can	unambiguously	be	told	from	the	rest.	
It	asserts,	in	other	words,	the	existence	in	a	field	of	a	reliable	hierarchy	of	worthiness.	
	
This	is	particularly	clear	in	the	dedication	of	Gettysburg:	in	the	midst	of	unprecedented	
and	seemingly	meaningless	slaughter,	symbolized	by	a	disorderly	battlefield,	the	clean	
splitting	of	space	into	a	sacred	shrine	and	its	profane	surroundings	asserted	the	
possibility	of	distinguishing	between	deservingness	and	its	absence,	the	worthwhile	and	
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the	worthless,	and	ultimately	between	good	and	bad.	As	Robert	P.	Harrison	perceptively	
observed,	that	effect	was	reinforced	by	the	text	of	Lincoln’s	address,	which	through	a	
series	of	subtle	shifts	managed	to	equate	the	dedicated	ground	at	Gettysburg	with	the	
nation	itself	and	the	distinctiveness	of	its	historical	mission.	This	backed	up	the	
distinction	Lincoln	was	delineating	in	physical	and	moral	space	with	one	of	the	few	
certitudes	that	remained	–	that	of	the	difference	between	this	nation	and	others:	
	
“The	word	here	occurs	a	full	eight	times	in	[Lincoln’s]	brief	address.	In	each	case	
it	points	to	the	ground	–	‘this	ground’	–	to	which	the	martyrs	and	victims	of	the	
nation’s	contradiction,	its	civil	war,	have	been	consigned.	A	discrete	grammatical	
breakthrough	–	from	‘that	nation’	at	the	beginning	of	the	address	to	‘this	nation’	
at	the	end	–	indicates	that	the	securement	of	the	nation’s	hic	has	taken	place,	
precisely	through	the	sepulchering	act	of	the	address	itself.	(…)	[Lincoln’s	
address]	makes	of	that	ground	the	place	where	the	nation	finds	itself,	on	which	it	
must	found,	or	refound,	its	republic.	(…)	The	‘here’	in	Lincoln’s	speech	is	where	
nation	and	[land]	come	together	on	that	plot	of	‘earth’	from	which	‘government	
of	the	people,	by	the	people,	for	the	people,	shall	not	perish”	(Harrison,	2003:	
28).	
	
Looking	at	consecration	as	a	population-level	phenomenon	therefore	stresses	its	
distinct	character	as	a	process	of	status	formation.	It	does	not	enhance	the	status	of	the	
consecrated	by	attesting	their	individual	greatness	–	as	credentialing	does	–	but	by	
stating	that	greatness	can	be	told	from	its	absence,	and	therefore	that	there	is	such	a	
thing	as	a	meaningful	and	reliable	hierarchy	of	it.	This	effect	is	achieved	through	the	
drawing	of	crisp	and	forceful	divides	between	the	chosen	and	the	rest	within	
populations	of	candidates.	Finally,	such	divides	are	not	drawn	by	those	enjoying	the	
status	increase,	but	by	a	third	party	endowed	with	the	ability	to	impose	legitimate	
judgments	in	a	given	field.	Of	course,	empirical	cases	that	we	commonly	refer	to	as	
instances	of	consecration	may	involve	an	element	of	credentialing.	The	above	definition,	
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however,	captures	the	conceptual	specificity	of	consecration	as	an	abstract	process	of	
status	formation.6	
	
	
Explaining	the	salient	features	of	retrospective	consecration	projects	
	
Ultimately	the	merit	of	that	definition	should	be	judged	at	its	ability	to	solve	empirical	
puzzles	in	the	study	of	status	formation.	In	the	meantime,	a	weaker	form	of	validation	
comes	from	the	light	it	casts	on	the	salient	features	of	retrospective	consecration	
projects.	My	definition	notably	suggests	that	consecrating	institutions	derive	some	of	
their	sway	from	the	forcefulness	of	the	divides	they	draw	between	the	chosen	and	
others:	if	consecration	works	by	asserting	the	existence	of	a	reliable	hierarchy,	the	
firmer	that	assertion,	the	more	weight	it	should	carry.	
	
We	usually	think	of	the	legitimacy	of	the	distinctions	between	the	chosen	and	others	as	
rooted	in	the	rationality	of	the	process	whereby	the	chosen	are	selected,	i.e.	in	the	
rational	criteria	used	by	consecrating	institutions	to	identify	deserving	individuals.	Allen	
and	Parsons	thus	write	that	“the	procedural	rationality	exhibited	by	the	[Baseball]	Hall	
of	Fame	contributes	greatly	to	its	legitimacy	as	a	consecration	project	(Allen	and	
Parsons,	2006:	808).	Likewise,	Parigi	has	shown	how	during	the	Counter-Reformation	
the	Catholic	Church	developed	rational,	bureaucratic	procedures	to	tell	who	it	would	
and	would	not	elevate	to	sainthood.	The	new	rules	helped	to	strengthen	the	legitimacy	
of	sainthood	amid	the	crisis	of	faith	created	by	the	Protestant	schism	(Parigi,	2012).	
	
																																																								
6	It	is	important	to	note	that	operations	of	retrospective	consecration,	precisely	because	they	happen	late	
in	the	career	of	individuals,	are	unlikely	to	serve	as	sources	of	credentialing:	no	one	really	needed	Bob	
Dylan	to	receive	the	Nobel	Prize	in	literature	to	know	that	Bob	Dylan	is	a	great	writer.	Retrospective	
consecration	therefore	lays	bare	what	else	is	going	on	in	these	operations	that	enhances	the	status	of	the	
consecrated	–	namely	the	affirmation	or	reaffirmation	of	the	existence	of	a	reliable	hierarchy	of	
greatness.	
16	
	
The	definition	I	have	proposed	suggests	that	the	legitimacy	of	retrospective	
consecration	divides	–	and	therefore	the	authority	of	the	institutions	responsible	for	
introducing	them	–	also	lies	in	these	divides’	unwavering	character:	individuals	should	
be	in	or	out,	and	no	doubt	should	subsist	as	to	the	side	that	they	stand	on.	Ambiguity	in	
that	matter	could	undermine,	not	the	perceived	discernment	of	consecrating	
institutions,	but	the	very	idea	that	it	is	possible	to	reliably	identify	individuals	that	are	
deserving	from	others	that	are	not.7	
	
Just	like	felicitous	power	rituals	rest	on	the	respect	of	grammatical	rules	of	ritual	
symbolism	(Kertzer,	1988),	then,	felicitous	retrospective	consecration	projects	entail	the	
respect	of	at	least	one	symbolic	rule	when	it	comes	to	partitioning	populations	of	
individuals	into	chosen	and	non-chosen:	namely,	that	this	partition	be	unflinching.	By	
following	that	rule,	consecrating	institutions	uphold	the	belief	in	the	possibility	of	
distinguishing	between	the	worthy	and	the	non-worthy,	and	therefore	in	the	
meaningfulness	of	the	dimension	of	worth	they	evaluate	candidates	upon.8	Thus,	beside	
the	procedural	rationality	of	consecrating	institutions,	the	mere	forcefulness	of	the	
divisions	they	draw	is	itself	a	source	of	their	legitimacy.9	
																																																								
7	As	an	example,	think	of	what	would	happen	if	Catholic	Church	officials	decreed	that	a	candidate	is	a	
saint	based	on	certain	criteria	but	not	on	others.	While	this	may	be	evidence	of	the	perceptiveness	of	
their	judgment,	it	could	also	lead	believers	to	question	the	notion	that	there	is	such	a	thing	as	sainthood.	
Here	one	can	remember	that	the	Church	does	not	grant	sainthood,	but	recognizes	it,	assuming	that	some	
individuals	are	saints	and	others	are	not	(Vauchez,	1981).	
8	Anand	and	Watson	(2004)	and	Anand	and	Jones	(2008)	make	the	related	argument	that	tournament	
rituals	help	to	constitute	fields	by	delineating	an	agreed-upon	order	of	worth	within	them.	
9	A	useful	way	of	envisioning	the	distinction	between	these	two	sources	of	legitimacy	is	to	think	of	how	
acts	of	retrospective	consecration	can	be	challenged.	One	may	refuse	a	prize	on	two	chief	grounds:	
because	one	disputes	the	ability	of	the	jury	to	objectively	evaluate	one’s	work	or	achievements;	or	
because	one	questions	the	meaningfulness	of	identifying	deserving	and	undeserving	individuals	in	a	given	
field.	David	Salle	disputed	the	former,	but	not	the	latter	–	hence	his	mix	of	contempt	and	respect	for	
consecrating	institutions	–	while	Bob	Dylan’s	reluctant	acceptance	of	the	Nobel	Prize	seemed	to	signal	
that	he	doubted	the	latter,	but	not	the	former.	
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That	consecrating	institutions	derive	part	of	their	authority	from	the	firmness	of	the	
divides	they	draw	has	important	implications.	It	places	logical	constraints	on	what	these	
institutions	can	do	without	jeopardizing	that	dimension	of	their	authority.	This	in	turn	
explains	some	of	the	characteristics	of	retrospective	consecration	projects.		
	
A	striking	feature	of	many	halls	of	fame	is	that	they	are	unlikely	to	deconsecrate	
individuals,	i.e.	to	rescind	a	spot	in	the	ranks	of	the	great.	This	is	true	even	when	
information	surfaces	that	would	seem	to	disqualify	a	previously	inducted	candidate,	or	
when	the	standards	for	making	it	in	evolve	in	such	a	way	that	past	inductees	would	not	
pass	muster	any	longer.	The	U.S.	Baseball	Hall	of	Fame	thus	features	plenty	of	players	
who	would	not	meet	today’s	induction	criteria:	Ty	Cobb	has	been	accused	of	espousing	
racist	views,	he	intentionally	tried	to	hurt	his	opponents	on	the	field,	and	he	was	prone	
to	violent	attacks	off	it.	The	same	holds	of	Babe	Ruth,	who	after	his	election	was	
reported	to	have	injected	himself	with	hormones	from	sheep’s	testicles.	Neither	player,	
however,	has	ever	been	threatened	with	exclusion	(Thurm,	2016).	In	fact,	the	Baseball	
Hall	of	Fame	does	not	have	a	mechanism	for	expelling	its	members,	and	nor	do	the	U.S.	
Basketball,	Pro	Football,	or	Boxing	Halls	of	Fame.	The	Catholic	Church	itself	has	no	
process	for	reopening	the	case	of	an	officially	recognized	saint.	The	only	time	the	Church	
has	ever	come	close	to	downgrading	a	group	of	saints	was	in	1969,	when	Pope	Paul	VI	
called	for	a	review	of	those	who	achieved	their	status	before	the	institution	of	formal	
canonization	proceedings	in	the	thirteenth	century.	But	even	these	figures	were	not	un-
sainted:	the	Church	merely	took	away	their	feast	days	(Woodward,	1996:	84).	
Retrospective	consecration	therefore	has	an	asymmetrical	character:	those	who	are	out	
can	get	in,	but	those	in	cannot	get	out.	
	
Another	distinct	trait	is	that	retrospective	consecration	projects	can	themselves	be	
sorted	into	hierarchies,	and	that	these	hierarchies	are	usually	topped	by	a	single	most	
prestigious	prize,	hall	of	fame,	or	academy.	There	is	only	one	National	Baseball	Hall	of	
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Fame,	and	in	most	domains	where	lifetime	achievement	awards	have	proliferated,	there	
is	still	a	unique	prize	standing	out	on	top	–	typically	the	Nobel	Prize,	or	the	“Nobel”	in	its	
subfield,	such	as	the	Fields	Medal	in	mathematics	or	the	Pritzker	Prize	for	architecture.	
James	English	gives	a	sense	of	that	tacitly	agreed-upon	hierarchy	in	his	account	of	the	
1994	founding	of	the	International	Congress	of	Distinguished	Awards,	whose	intended	
purpose	was	“to	help	the	media	sort	out	the	legitimately	important	and	respected	
prizes	from	the	ever-increasing	rabble	of	wannabes:”	
	
“When	Larry	Tise	set	about	founding	the	International	Congress	of	Distinguished	
Awards,	(…)	he	traveled	to	Stockholm	to	speak	to	people	at	the	Nobel	
Foundation.	They	were	cordial	and	encouraging	about	the	venture,	but	seemed	
to	take	it	as	understood	that	the	Nobel	itself	could	never	join	such	an	
organization;	the	function	of	the	ICDA	would	be	to	secure	and	defend	the	upper	
tier	of	the	awards	pyramid	–	the	tier,	that	is,	just	below	the	untouchable	
pinnacle	on	which	the	Nobel	alone	resides”	(English,	2005:	62).	
	
Both	the	asymmetrical	nature	of	retrospective	consecration	and	the	existence	in	many	
fields	of	a	single	pinnacle	of	greatness	make	sense	if	we	consider	that	consecrating	
institutions	draw	some	of	their	authority	from	the	forcefulness	of	the	divisions	they	
introduce	between	the	chosen	and	others.	Letting	previously	recognized	greats	go	back	
to	ordinariness	would	blur	these	divisions.	It	would	not	necessarily	undermine	the	
perception	that	consecrating	institutions	have	good	judgment	–	in	fact,	the	sensible	
thing	to	do	when	new	evidence	emerges	of	an	athlete’s	wrongdoing	should	be	to	expel	
them	from	their	respective	hall	of	fame.	This,	however,	would	signal	that	greatness	is	in	
flux,	threatening	to	shake	observers’	belief	in	the	existence	of	a	reliable	hierarchy	of	it.	
Along	similar	lines,	having	more	than	one	pinnacle	of	greatness	could	further	muddy	
consecration	divides.	Two	or	more	top	consecrating	institutions	would	inevitably	
disagree	in	their	lists	of	the	great	–	some	of	the	candidates	deemed	worthy	by	one	
would	almost	certainly	be	ruled	out	by	others.	Again	this	would	signal	the	variability	of	
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greatness,	and	suggest	that	it	may	not	be	such	a	consistent	thing	after	all.	Instead,	the	
refusal	to	deconsecrate,	and	the	existence	in	many	fields	of	a	single	highest	
retrospective	consecration	project,	contribute	to	uphold	the	belief	in	a	meaningful	and	
judicable	hierarchy	of	greatness.10	
	
	
Conclusion	
	
This	article	has	explored	the	analytical	payoffs	of	looking	at	consecration	as	a	
population-level	phenomenon.	This	approach,	I	have	argued,	makes	possible	to	uncover	
the	theoretical	specificity	of	consecration	as	a	process	of	status	formation:	it	acts	on	the	
perceived	value	of	things	or	individuals,	not	by	confirming	that	they	are	individually	
worthy,	but	by	asserting	the	existence	in	a	field	of	a	reliable	hierarchy	of	worthiness.	
This	is	done	through	the	delineation	of	clear-cut	divisions	between	the	chosen	and	the	
rest	within	populations	of	candidates.	I	have	also	shown	how	this	characterization	helps	
make	sense	of	the	unwillingness	of	consecrating	institutions	to	rescind	the	honors	that	
they	grant,	and	of	the	existence	in	many	fields	of	a	single	pinnacle	of	greatness.	
	
The	conceptual	clarity	of	that	characterization	does	not	come	at	the	cost	of	empirical	
generality:	consecration	as	defined	here	can	be	identified	in	a	wide	array	of	social	
settings,	from	religion	to	the	arts,	science,	and	politics.	Yet	there	is	also	a	broader	form	
of	generality	to	the	reasoning	in	this	article.	Consecration,	I	have	argued,	enhances	the	
status	of	the	great	by	affirming	that	there	is	such	a	thing	as	a	meaningful	hierarchy	of	
greatness.	Ultimately	this	reminds	us	that	different	things	can	only	have	different	status	
to	the	extent	that	we	first	recognize	the	existence	of	a	hierarchy	of	value.	To	accept	
																																																								
10	The	same	line	of	reasoning	may	explain	why	Baseball	Hall	of	Fame	voters	have	been	reluctant	to	leave	
out	certain	steroid-era	greats	–	such	as	players	Barry	Bonds	and	Roger	Clemens	–	after	inducting	others	–	
e.g.	manager	Tony	La	Russa	or	former	commissioner	Bud	Selig	(Epstein,	2016).	Each	of	these	individual	
decisions	could	be	justified	on	rational	grounds,	but	together	they	would	suggest	an	inconsistency	in	the	
definition	of	greatness	(successful,	steroids-related	careers	could	both	be	considered	great	and	not).	
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differences	in	rewards	between	people	as	legitimate,	for	example,	we	first	need	to	
believe	that	it	makes	sense	to	view	different	people	as	unequally	deserving	–	that	it	is	
meaningful	to	consider	that	various	people	are	of	lesser	or	greater	quality.	I	have	further	
argued	that	this	belief	can	rest	on	the	performance	of	certain	social	operations	–	such	as	
operations	of	consecration.	
	
That	line	of	thinking	can	be	transposed	outside	the	domain	of	greatness	alone.	In	
particular,	it	suggests	that	different	statements	can	only	have	different	truth-value	if	we	
first	acknowledge	that	there	exists	such	a	thing	as	a	hierarchy	of	truth.	It	also	begs	the	
question:	what	kind	of	social	operations	may	strengthen	our	recognition	of	the	
existence	of	a	hierarchy	of	truth	–	and	conversely	what	operations	may	undermine	such	
a	recognition?	While	it	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	article	to	answer	these	questions,	
recent	American	history	suggests	that	the	now	familiar	pattern	of	drawing	or	blurring	
divides	between	things	that	are	considered	true	and	others	that	are	not	may	contribute	
to	strengthen	or	weaken	our	belief	in	the	existence	of	a	hierarchy	of	truth.	In	a	2016	
interview	with	journalist	David	Remnick,	Barack	Obama	thus	observed	that	“the	new	
media	ecosystem	‘means	everything	is	true	and	nothing	is	true	(…)	An	explanation	of	
climate	change	from	a	Nobel	Prize-winning	physicist	looks	exactly	the	same	on	your	
Facebook	page	as	the	denial	of	climate	change	by	somebody	on	the	Koch	brothers’	
payroll’”	(Remnick,	2016).	On	a	similar	note,	
	
“the	Russian	dissident	and	chess	grandmaster	Garry	Kasparov	drew	upon	long	
familiarity	with	that	process	when	he	recently	tweeted	[commenting	on	current	
developments	in	U.S.	presidential	politics]:	‘The	point	of	modern	propaganda	is	
not	only	to	misinform	or	push	an	agenda.	It	is	to	exhaust	your	critical	thinking,	to	
annihilate	truth.’	Mr.	Kasparov	grasp[ed]	that	the	real	threat	is	not	merely	that	a	
large	number	of	Americans	have	become	accustomed	to	rejecting	factual	
information	(…).	The	real	danger	is	that,	inundated	with	‘alternative	facts,’	many	
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voters	will	simply	shrug,	asking	‘What	is	truth?’	–	and	not	wait	for	an	answer”	
(Sykes,	2017).	
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